Economic and mathematical modeling of resource allocation among projects in a project-oriented organization
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.26661/2522-1566/2026-3/37-30Keywords:
project-oriented organization, resource allocation, transfer pricing, responsibility centers, Cournot model, Nash equilibrium, project portfolio optimizationAbstract
The article examines the problem of efficient allocation of limited resources among projects under multi-project conditions and substantiates the expediency of applying a transfer pricing mechanism in project-oriented organizations. The purpose of the study is to develop an economic and mathematical model for the optimal allocation of resources, taking into account the costs of resource formation, the needs of individual projects, limited resource capacity, and the economic interests of the participants. The methodological framework combines a systems approach, economic and mathematical modeling, transfer pricing, and game theory. Project teams and resource supply centers are considered independent responsibility centers involved in economic interactions concerning the formation, transfer, and use of resources. A model has been developed that relates the volumes of resource formation and consumption to the production and organizational costs of the respective responsibility centers. The Cournot model and the Nash equilibrium concept are applied to determine equilibrium resource consumption levels and the optimal internal transfer price. The proposed approach provides a mechanism for coordinating the economic interests of individual projects and resource centers while accounting for the interdependence of decisions under resource constraints. The practical significance of the model lies in its potential application to project portfolio optimization, assessment of resource utilization efficiency, and substantiation of strategic and tactical management decisions under conditions of resource scarcity, risk, and uncertainty. The proposed approach also contributes to greater transparency of internal resource flows and improved accountability of project teams.
JEL: O22, M11, M12, C72.
References
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REFERENCES
Project Management Institute. A Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK® Guide) – Seventh Edition and The Standard for Project Management. Newtown Square, PA : Project Management Institute, 2021. 250 p.
Engwall M., Jerbrant A. The resource allocation syndrome: The prime challenge of multi-project management? International Journal of Project Management. 2003. Vol. 21, No. 6. P. 403–409. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/S0263-7863(02)00113-8.
Browning T. R., Yassine A. A. Resource-constrained multi-project scheduling: Priority rule performance revisited. International Journal of Production Economics. 2010. Vol. 126, No. 2. P. 212–228. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2010.03.009.
Brickley J. A., Smith C. W., Zimmerman J. L. Transfer Pricing and the Control of Internal Corporate Transactions. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance. 2020. Vol. 32, No. 1. P. 120–127. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/jacf.12393.
Hirshleifer J. Internal Pricing and Decentralized Decisions. Management Controls: New Directions in Basic Research / ed. by C. P. Bonini, R. K. Jaedicke, H. M. Wagner. New York : McGraw-Hill, 1964. P. 27–37.
Eccles R. G. The Transfer Pricing Problem: A Theory for Practice. Lexington, MA : Lexington Books, 1985. 341 p.
Fudenberg D., Tirole J. Game Theory. Cambridge, MA : MIT Press, 1991. 604 p.
Osborne M. J. An Introduction to Game Theory. New York : Oxford University Press, 2004. 533 p.
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